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In the paper we will study the notions of possible-worlds semantics, 
fiction, and creativity. The intention is to show how the notion of pos-
sible-worlds semantics allows us to generate a fresh interpretation of 
the notions of fiction and creativity. To do this, we have to consider the 
philosophy of logic. Possible-worlds semantics can be used in inter-
preting modal notions. The intention is to interpret the notions of fic-
tion and creativity as modal notions. However, the analysis shows that 
the notions of fiction and creativity are multimodal notions.
Key  words: possible-world semantics, fiction, creativity, philosophy 
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Introduction
The notions of possible-worlds semantics, fiction, and creativity 
are all of great importance. The notions operate in different areas; it 
may be hard to see the interconnection between the notions. The notion 
of the possible world is connected to logic and science, and the notions 
of fiction and creativity are connected to art. Therefore, there is a large 
gap between the areas of applications of the notions. We are not saying 
that the notions have a necessary interconnection, but that the notions 
can be interconnected in a fruitful way. In particular, we will show how 
the notion of possible-worlds semantics allows us to generate a fresh 
interpretation of the notions of fiction and creativity.
The notion of possible-worlds semantics is a logical notion that has 
a long and deep history in philosophy and in logic. This makes the inter-
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pretation of the notion very hard to apply. It is well known that Leibniz 
used the notion of the possible world in his philosophy. The notion re-
fers to the possibilities God had when he was creating the world: God 
picked the best of all possible worlds. The possible-worlds semantics 
for modal logic are based on this idea. First strict logical formulations 
for the possible-worlds semantics were formulated in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s by Kanger, Montague, Hintikka, and Kripke (among oth-
ers) (Hintikka, 1989; Copeland, 2002).
Possible-worlds semantics was used in interpreting modal notions, 
like necessity and possibility (alethic modalities), knowledge and belief 
(epistemic modalities), and obligatory and permitted (deontic modali-
ties). The Aristotelian interpretation of (aletic) modalities was the so-
called temporal interpretation. That is, something is possible if it takes 
place at some moment in time, and something is necessary if it takes 
place all the time (Hintikka, 1974). Possible worlds allow us to give 
an atemporal  interpretation of  the modal notions, as Leibniz’s exam-
ple demonstrates. Something is possible if there is a possible world in 
which it is true, and something is necessary if it is true in every possible 
world. Possible worlds are formulated in the same logical space, and 
hence, in a logical sense, they are realised in the same time. The pos-
sible world interpretation may seem quite easy to accept: of course, it 
is possible that I could be in some other place than I factually am right 
now. The temporal interpretation is not natural in these kinds of cases: 
the fact that something is, right now, such and such excludes the pos-
sibility that things could be otherwise in the same time and place – such 
possibilities never take place. How can we make such a non-temporal 
interpretation precise? Let p be a sentence. We say that it is possible 
that p if we can construct or imagine a state of affairs in which p is true. 
This does not give a full answer to the problem. However, it helps us 
to locate the problem more precisely. We have to consider the methods 
of construction or imagination and the character of the states of affairs 
(Lewis, 1973).
The notions of fact and fiction need to be specified. How are they 
or, rather, how could they be interrelated? To answer questions like this, 
we have to specify what kinds of things are called fact and fiction. For 
example, “It is a fact that p” seems to mean something like “p is true”, 
where ‘p’ is a descriptive sentence. So, facts are something that is pic-
tured by true descriptive sentences. Facts are not linguistic, but factual 
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entities. Fiction is something non-factual: so, fiction can be character-
ised as something that can be characterised by false sentences. This is 
connected to the separation between fact and fiction in literary theory, 
which says that fiction is just “the child of my brain” (Davis, 1983, 
14). The separation is difficult to make precise, since Defoe says that 
his novel is based “in truth of fact: and so the work is not a story, but a 
history” (Davis, 1983, 15). How can a novel be non-fictive? The idea is 
that “fact” and “fiction” are “not defining two distinct and unimpeach-
able categories” (Davis, 1983, 9).
The notion of creativity  is,  if possible, a messier notion than the 
notion of fiction. Is creativity something characterising humanity? It 
is obvious – by definition – that a human being can be creative, but it 
is problematic whether a computer or an animal can be. The specific 
meaning of the notion remains unclear. Maybe the reason is that such a 
notion escapes, by definition, all the exact characterisations. The notion 
belongs to the class of notions that Hodges (2001) calls scaling adjec-
tives. These kinds of notions are neither true nor false, but they are more 
or less adequate.
About logic
As a field of science, logic is of a very special kind. It can be seen as 
a branch of mathematics or of philosophy. As a branch of mathematics, 
it is sometimes understood as the mechanical manipulation of symbols 
– just as the whole of mathematics has been understood – just as a mere 
game. As a branch of philosophy, one may understand it as a logico-
conceptual analysis of philosophical topics (Hintikka, 1973). However, 
logic as a branch of mathematics does not mean that it is just the mani-
pulation of symbols; moreover as a philosophical logic, it does not mean 
a philosophical reflection of “the eternal themes”. Logic is both the 
manipulation of symbols and thinking deep, philosophical questions. 
The manipulation of symbols is not a goal of logic but a means of logic. 
If logic is understood mainly as the manipulation of symbols, this is a 
great misunderstanding. When Russell said that “Logic is hell!” he did 
not mean that it is difficult, or boring, to manipulate the symbols, but it 
is extremely difficult to keep in mind the subtle logical topics. It is easy 
just to manipulate symbols, but extremely difficult to keep in mind the 
foundational logical subject matter.
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For example, Boole wrote a book called An Investigation of the 
Laws of Thought in which he sets out to “investigate the fundamental 
laws of those operations of the mind by which reasoning is performed” 
(Boole, 2005, 1). This shows the deep philosophical importance of log-
ic. In the present day mathematical logic, the deep content may be dif-
ficult to grasp, but surely the intention is not the mere manipulation of 
symbols. The intention is not, as was the intention of Boole, to find out 
laws of thought in a metaphysical or psychological sense. In the meta-
physical sense, “the laws of thought” could be understood as something 
on the fundamental reality of mental being. In the same sense, “the 
laws of nature” can be understood as a metaphysical fundament of na-
ture (Rakshit, 1999, 7). In a psychological sense, “the laws of thought” 
mean empirical facts about how humans actually work. Mathematics 
as a formal science is neither a metaphysical nor empirical analysis. 
However, still there are several opportunities open to meaningful math-
ematical and logical study.
The logical study can be divided into two different but closely con-
nected areas: proof theory and model theory. To understand the idea of 
proof theory, let us consider the following quote from Nagel and New-
man (1989):
“The formalization proceeds in four steps. First, a complete catalogue is pre-
pared of the signs to be used in the calculus. These are its vocabulary. Second, 
the ‘Formation Rules’ are laid down. They declare which of the combinati-
ons of the signs in the vocabulary are acceptable as ‘formulas’ (in effect, as 
sentences). The rules may be viewed as constituting the grammar of the sy-
stem. Third, the ‘Transformation Rules’ are stated. They describe the precise 
structure of formulas which other formulas of given structure are derivable. 
These rules are, in effect, the rules of inference. Finally, certain formulas are 
selected as axioms (or as ‘primitive formulas’). They serve as a foundation 
for the entire system. We shall use the phrase ‘theorem of the system’ to deno-
te any formula that can be derived from the axioms by successively applying 
the Transformation Rules. By a formal ‘proof’ (or ‘demonstration’) we shall 
mean a finite sequence of formulas, each of which either is an axiom or can 
be derived from preceding formulas in the sequence by the Transformation 
Rules.” (Nagel, Newman, 1989, 45–46)
The quotation explicates very clearly what the formalization of a 
language is: it means explication of the whole language, its symbols, 
grammar, and rules of inference, and moreover, the explication of the 
sentences that are assumed as axioms. From the axioms, one can use 
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the inference rules to infer new sentences, called theorems. If the set 
of axioms is recursive, we say that the corresponding set of theorems 
is axiomatizable. As a special case, the set of axioms may be an empty 
set: then the set of theorems is just the set of logical truths. In fact, 
there are infinite numbers of proofs (Hodges, 2001). The very idea is 
that logical – and also mathematical – proofs are demonstrations of 
(logical or mathematical) truths. The notion of demonstration refers to 
the constructivity of logic and mathematics: proofs are built up step by 
step from the explicated starting point to the end state. However, the 
demonstration is possible only if the whole system is explicated, that is, 
only if it is formalized. The fundamental idea behind the constructivity 
is the finitary nature of the proofs (Neumann, 1989). In empirical sci-
ence, such a demonstration is not possible: the formalization supposes 
that there would be metaphysical natural laws and that our scientific 
laws are adequately formulated (Rakshit, 1999). Aristotelian science 
assumes that axioms are “obvious truths”; hence the results of science 
are certain truths (Hintikka, Halonen, Mutanen, 2002, 295–337).
The proof theory as a syntactical and finitary approach may be the 
kind of mathematical reasoning one has in mind when speaking about 
the mere manipulation of symbols. However, in school (and also in uni-
versity) mathematics, one central topic is called calculus, which is very 
technical – the manipulation of symbols – but at the same applied math-
ematics. In general, the notion of calculus refers to the manipulation of 
symbols, which can be interpreted and reinterpreted. Hence calculus 
operates between proof theory and model theory.
According  to  The  Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy,  model 
theory is “a branch of mathematical logic that deals with the connection 
between a language and its interpretations or structures” (Audi, 1995, 
502). The characterisation emphasises that, in model theory, the inten-
tion is to study the interpretations of the language. In proof theory, the 
idea is to study the formal syntactical properties of language, that is, to 
study uninterpreted language. Hence, the aim of model theory is, in a 
sense, opposite to the aim of proof theory. The interpretation can be giv-
en in very general terms, as different kinds of interpretations of whole 
mathematical theories: “Model theory is the study of the construction 
and classification of structures within specified classes of structures” 
(Hodges, 1993, ix). Models are non-linguistic entities, but they are de-
fined relative to a language.
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In model theory, the models are entities that may be called com-
plete models. That is, models fix all the facts. The construction of mod-
els  is  an  infinite  task  even  if  the  construction  can  start  from a  finite 
number of entities (Hodges, 1993; Mutanen, 2004). This means, for 
example, that any given sentence is either true or false in a given model. 
So, each sentence divides the class of all models (of the corresponding 
language) into two classes: the class of models in which the sentence 
is true, and the class of models in which the sentence is false. The pos-
sibilities for linguistic description of models are very restricted. Linden-
baum’s lemma says that any consistent set of sentences can be extended 
into a maximally consistent set of sentences. The proof of the lemma 
shows how several logical and mathematical proofs are in fact limit 
proofs (Mutanen, 2004). A set of sentences is a maximally consistent 




In model theory, the models are infinite entities. The cardinality of 
the model, that is, the number of entities in the domain, is often infinite. 
Moreover, the number of sentences that are true in a given model is infi-
nite. In model theory, finitary methods have been developed that enable 
us to develop a philosophically and practically more realistic approach. 
Let us mention model sets, urn models, distributive normal forms, and 
methods for model construction. Model sets are not strictly model theo-
retical entities, but sets of sentences. Model sets operate between proof 
theory and model theory. In model theory, for example, Henkin models 
have a similar role. For us, these are of central importance.
Lindenbaum’s lemma shows that each such consistent set of sen-
tences can be extended to a maximally consistent set. This means that 
all such finitary characterisations are incomplete – but some of them 
are more genius than others. These finitary methods are recipes for con-
structing complete models (Hintikka, 1962; Hintikka, 1987). A logical 
fact is that the less information there is,  the easier it  is to construct a 
consistent story from it. However, the creativity is to generate a finitary 
story that gives a recipe for constructing deeply moving stories.
The  soundness  and  the  completeness  of  the  first-order  logic  say 
that  the  proof  theoretical  and  model  theoretical  approaches  are  very 
closely related: a sentence is provable if and only if it is valid. However, 




“After the work of Gödel and Tarski, it simply is impossible to maintain that 
the  meaning  of  propositions  is  constituted  via  their  inferential  relations  to 
other propositions. Meaning is a matter of semantics, and the overwhelming 
impact of the work that began with Tarski and Gödel is to make it clear that 
the semantical relationship cannot be reduced to syntactical ones.” (Hintikka, 
2007, 109)
Feferman (2006) underlines the interconnection as follows:
“To a first approximation there are two main kinds of pursuit in logic. The 
first is the traditional one going back two millennia, concerned with characte-
rizing the logically valid inferences. The second is the one that emerged most 
systematically only in the twentieth century, concerned with the semantics of 
logical operations. In the view of modern, model-theoretical eyes, the first 
requires the second, but not vice versa.” (Feferman, 2006, 453)
The difference between the proof theoretical and model theoretical 
approaches reflects a deeper philosophical difference, as was explicated 
in van Heijenoort (1967). He calls the approaches “logic as language” 
and “logic as calculus”. The idea is that the first group thinks of logic 
as a single language, more precisely, a language with a fixed interpreta-
tion. Then a natural approach is just proof theoretical: one has to use the 
language one has. On the contrary, the idea behind the approach called 
“logic as calculus” is that logic can be re-interpreted: one may give new 
interpretations to the language quite freely (Heijenoort, 1967). Hintik-
ka generalises the distinction so that it can be applied to more general 
philosophical approaches: the one language assumption and the model 
theoretical approach. Hintikka argues that the distinction reflects deeper 
philosophical presuppositions behind different kinds of philosophical 
approaches. For example, the famous Wittgensteinian attitude that we 
are prisoners of our language becomes understandable if we recognise 
that the presupposition of this attitude is the one language assumption. 
According  to Hintikka, other members of  the group are philosophers 
like young Carnap and Russell. For example, Derrida’s interpretation 
of the writing (Derrida, 1982, 12–14) or Heidegger’s notion of truth as 
“a fundamental existentiale” (Heidegger, 1988, 343) can be understood 
if we recognise that these are based on the presupposition that we are 
bound to our language.
The philosophical difference between the two approaches is not 
whether language has interpretation or not, but whether one can vary 
A. Mutanen: Possible-Worlds Semantics, Fiction … METODIČKI OGLEDI, 21 (2014) 2, 53–69
60
the interpretation. If there is no possibility to vary the interpretation, we 
are speaking about the reality we have. There is no philosophical reason 
to study model theory. So, proof theory becomes a natural branch of 
logic. Hence logic is a study of language of fixed interpretation, which 
is,  in  the  ideal case,  lingua characterica or, even,  lingua universalis. 
As Wittgenstein says in Tractatus, logic does not need experience, but 
“logic precedes every experience” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 5.552). Logic 
provides a formal structure in which all experience takes place. So, in 
logic, we cannot say that such and such things are in the world (Witt-
genstein, 1922, 5.61). For Wittgenstein, the philosophy of logic is part 
and parcel of his philosophy of language. So, Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
of logic also characterises his philosophy of language more generally. 
The model theoretical approach views logic as a freely interpretable 
calculus. In this sense, logic is like calculus ratiocinator. More gener-
ally, natural language can be thought of as freely interpretable. That is, 
our language is not bound to a single reality but can be connected to 
different realities. The philosophical problem is what these different 
realities are (Lewis, 1973).
The interconnection of logic – or language – to a reality is not easy 
to build up. The Wittgensteinian answer is that there is no philosophi-
cally justifiable ways to do this. According to Tractatus, “the proposi-
tion shows its sense” (Wittgenstein, 1922, 4.022). The meaning of a 
language cannot be stated (in the language). In this sense, we are bound 
into the language: “the limits of my language are the limits of my world” 
(Wittgenstein, 1922, 5.6). However, the Wittgensteinian approach is not 
enough for all philosophers. There is a proper need to formulate explic-
it semantics of logic and language (Niiniluoto, 1999; Hintikka, 2007). 
Tarski formulated a logically strict method for the study of semantics.
Tarski, in his papers of 1933 and 1944, formulated a notion of 
truth. His primary aim was to explicate the notion of truth formulated 
by Aristotle in Metaphysics as follows:
“To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say 
of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true.” (Tarski, 2001, 70)
Tarski was looking at the formal definition for this intuitive or pre-
theoretical notion. To do the job, Tarski developed an explicit method, 
which is known as model theory. Tarski, in his formulation of the Aris-
totelian notion, formulated a notion of truth within a single interpreta-
tion, which can be called the truth in a model – not in all models, as 
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general model theoretical notion does (Hodges, 1986, 135–151). The 
notion of truth in a model is very practical; it is the notion we have in 
mind when we speak about truth: truth is just truth in reality. Tarski’s 
formulation included several important model theoretical notions that 
are needed in interpreting language.
Fiction
Above, we characterised the notion of fiction as something not-
true. The distinction between truth and not-true has to be specified more 
closely. Tarski’s notion of truth can also be applied in the analysis of 
an everyday notion of truth. In general, narratives are not truth telling 
but storytelling, and storytelling obeys more complex logic than a true-
false distinction presupposes.
Dorrit Cohn (2006) characterises fiction as non-referential use of 
language. The characterisation can be understood by using the model 
theoretical notion of truth given by Tarski. The referential use of lan-
guage  means  that  the  notions  of  the  factual  use  of  language  refer  to 
reality. So, fictive texts are things that are not searching for truth in a 
proper sense – namely, in the sense of truth in reality. That allows fic-
tive writing to be proper “verbal artistry”, the skill needed in generat-
ing creative works of literature (Cohn, 2006). The interpretation Cohn 
gives is one expression of one world interpretation. The referential use 
of words means that a given word has a real referent, meaning that it de-
notes an existing entity in reality – in the only (existing) world. The one 
world interpretation is not unusual in philosophy or in literary theory 
(Dolezel, 1988).
The referentiality is not good enough to do the job intended. Fic-
tive literature operates in so many fields that we need more subtle con-
ceptual tools. The tools we need have to be capable of being edificative 
in a strong sense (Davis, 1983, 15). In literature, the stories character-
ise linguistically some courses of events. As the characterisation above 
shows, models are non-linguistic entities that give static descriptions of 
states of affairs. So, it seems that model theory has not so much to do 
with literature.
In  literature,  stories  are  usually  multidimensional  complexes  in 
which different kinds of factors build the whole. The factors can be of 
different kinds, like historically different versions of the same stories; 
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different, but interconnecting courses of events; different interconnect-
ing modalities. One dimension in evaluating literature is to evaluate the 
multidimensionality and the cleverness of interconnecting the different 
kinds of factors to play together. For example, the story of Doctor Faus-
tus has several different versions, including old folk stories. The ver-
sion written by Goethe includes several different dimensions so that the 
whole story pictures and, at the same, problematizes the whole lifestyle 
of the western world (von Wright, 1989).
The interconnection of different kinds of factors, the multidimen-
sionality, is obviously present in high-quality literature. However, it is 
not easy to characterise what it precisely means, and how to evaluate 
it. The different factors we have referred to may operate in different 
areas, like factual, epistemic, deonitic, and ethical. Philosophically, this 
means that the language must be modal – and the underlying logic must 
also be modal, or more precisely, the language must be multimodal. The 
multimodality means that, in the text, different modalities play together 
so that changes in one modality area may cause changes in the field of 
another modality: for example, new knowledge may cause changes in 
ethical responsibility. Dolezel (1988) speaks about semantical unhomo-
geneity in this sense (Dolezel, 1988, 234). The way these interconnec-
tions are built up can be seen as an indicator of creativity.
To consider modalities, we have to use modal language, which 
means that we have to consider possible worlds (Hintikka, 1969; Hin-
tikka, 2007; Lewis, 1973). For example, knowledge is not just to own 
information, but something which excludes uncertainty (Hintikka, 
2002, 52). So, knowledge that p makes it possible for the knower to 
identify reliably states of affairs in which p holds. That is, knowledge 
divides relevant worlds into two classes: knowledge worlds and non-
knowledge worlds. Because of the truth condition, the actual reality has 
to be in the class of knowledge worlds. The character of modal logic is 
identified by the relationship between the possible worlds, then assess-
ability relation: for example, if reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry 
hold between the worlds, we have the modal system S5. The method of 
identifying individuals in different worlds, cross-world identification, is 
central to developing quantified modal logics. In particular, cross-world 
identification is a key notion in characterising the identity of individu-
als. The notion of identifiability is both theoretically and practically 
important (Hintikka, 2007).
A. Mutanen: Possible-Worlds Semantics, Fiction … METODIČKI OGLEDI, 21 (2014) 2, 53–69
63
Possible worlds are not necessarily model theoretical complete 
worlds. They may be more practical or more concrete entities. How-
ever, the model theoretical complete model is the fundamental notion in 
model theory. To get an idea of what the notion of a possible world may 
mean in some practical applications, let us use Hintikka’s remark:
“They have been misled by the term ‘possible world’. They have taken it as 
its face value. This is an abject mistake. It used to be said that the Holy Roman 
Empire was not holy, nor Roman, nor much of an empire, either. A possible 
world need not be possible in the traditional sense, as is shown by Rantala’s 
urn models.” (Hintikka, 1987, 24)
Moreover, we may add to the remark that a possible world need not 
be a (complete) world either.
In philosophical applications, we need a flexible notion of a model 
or of a possible world. According to the model theoretical approach 
– and in a sense also the proof theoretical approach – the fundamental 
idea is to characterise a reality by using the linguistic tools we have. To 
make the idea systematic, we get a notion of a model set that “is a set 
of formulas that intuitively speaking can be interpreted as a partial de-
scription of a model in which all its formulas are true” (Hintikka, 1987, 
11). The model set approach is of extreme value. It is extremely simple 
and intuitively clear.
The model set approach seems to be very fruitful in analysing lit-
erature. In literature, the characterisation is merely linguistic. The au-
thor writes a story in which they picture the multimodal reality. Such 
a characterisation is always incomplete. However, some stories are ex-
plicit enough to allow us to see the intended reality, that is, to see the 
essential aspects of the reality. Similarly to the case of the model set, 
these characterisations allow us to generate complete characterisations. 
However, there are several different complete models that can be gener-
ated from a given model set. Especially if a given model set is contra-
dictory, the model construction becomes frustrated. This shows that it is 
easy to construct a story if one knows only a few things; in fact, if fewer 
known things are given, slighter restrictions are imposed on the model 
construction (Kahneman, 2011). In high-quality literature, the charac-
terisation is rich, but the richness opens deep lines of thoughts.
The model set we generate need not be correlated with the actual 
reality, and hence sentences true in a model set need not be true in a 
proper sense. So, the notion of a referent can be used within a model set. 
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It is clear that a word may have a referent in a given model set without 
us assuming that the word has a referent in reality. For example, Sher-
lock Holmes has a referent in Holmes stories, but he is not a real person. 
Model sets are something we may call small worlds, and hence they can 
be handled easily. Model sets say in logical terms the same as Dolezel 
when he says that “fictional worlds are sets of possible states of affairs” 
(Dolezel, 1988, 230). Fictional worlds are just partial descriptions of 
states of affairs. As the notion of the model set shows, such a descrip-
tion is not a complete description of the world; the full description sup-
poses an (uncountable) infinite number of sentences.1
The  fact  that  the  descriptions  are  incomplete  means  that  there 
are questions that cannot be answered: for example, the question of 
whether Sherlock Holmes has a birthmark on his back (Hintikka, 2007; 
Dolezel, 1988, 223). The descriptions in the books do not give the in-
formation needed to answer the question and there are no other sources 
of information that could be used. In the case of real-world problems, 
we can make observations, or even experiments, to get further informa-
tion. However, to identify individuals and events, one has to put the 
individuals or events on the map, to locate them (Hintikka, 2007). The 
author does this by using different methods of identification. A central 
part of the creativity is how the author does the identification.
The descriptions can be formulated in different books or short sto-
ries, as in the case of Sherlock Holmes, or only in a single book. More-
over, the stories can be developed from an oral tradition into sophisti-
cated poetry, which may have at the same time a counterpart in reality, 
like the story of Doctor Faustus. Such descriptions may contain several 
different kinds of stories, and hence the wholeness may be incompat-
ible. Moreover, a single story may be internally inconsistent.
A possible world is a model set, and the class of possible worlds is 
hence just a class of model sets. However, we have the following situ-
ation. Each sentence and each (consistent) set of sentences generates 
a class of possible worlds. This is an obvious mathematical fact. This 
implies that each sentence (and set of sentences) is vague in the sense 
that it allows such different interpretations. What does it mean for a 
sentence to be true? It means that the actual world is included in the set 
of models that make the sentence true.
1 In special cases possible worlds can be finite; see Hintikka, 1984. 
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The notion of the model set can be used in analysing modal notions 
like possibility or knowledge. To speak about the possibility or impos-
sibility of something, or about what somebody knows or does not know, 
we have to speak about several different possibilities. The analysis of 
the semantics of modal notions cannot be done without using a notion 
of a possible world or the like. For example, to say that p is possible in 
model set X means that there is a model set X’ acceptable from X, so 
that p is true in X’. Similarly, ‘a knows that p’ is true in model set X if p 
is true in every model set X’ accessible from X (Hintikka, 1962). Here 
we see that possibility operates like an existential and a knowledge op-
erator like a universal operator. By giving some properties to the acces-
sibility relation, we get different modal logical systems.
The idea behind multimodality is that we get a complete analysis of 
epistemic notions by “mixing alethic, tense and epistemic logic” (Hend-
ricks, 2007, 130). Cohn (2006) defined fiction as a non-referential mode 
of language that does not characterise fiction clearly enough. The story 
about Sherlock Holmes is according to Cohn’s interpretation of fiction, 
because the name Sherlock Holmes does not refer to any actual person. 
However, it is reasonable to discuss Sherlock Holmes within the story 
world – it is reasonable to ask about the education Holmes has or the 
methods Holmes uses, just as in the case of a real person. The only dif-
ference is that the final decisions are based on the books, and in the case 
of a real person on reality.
The story can use different modalities in the characterisation. The 
characterisation may use factual, epistemic, ethical, or behavioural mo-
dalities. The idea is to interconnect different kinds of modalities in a 
way that forces us to evaluate our fundamental values. For example, 
Quentin Tarantino’s movies show brute violence without any reason. In 
fact, the movies exclude the question about reason; the acting horizon 
is depleted of rationality. Hannah Arendt speaks about the banality of 
violence in which the violence becomes in a sense meaningless: what 
happens to our fundamental ethical values? They seem to disappear 
– we have to re-evaluate all the values.
Creativity
The notion of creativity is one central notion that characterises hu-
manity. However, by definition, it is something very difficult to define. 
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Plato characterises a poet’s creativity as madness. However, creativ-
ity as madness is not unknown for present-day thinkers. The link be-
tween creativity and madness is not very fruitful. If creativity is just 
something mad or something strange, how can it be so valuable? Dawis 
(1973) defines possible worlds as a nested class so that the actual world 
is in the centre of the nested system. The relation of similarity is defined 
as a distance relation between the models in the nested system of mod-
els. One interpretation of creativity as madness could be that creativity 
refers to the long distance from the centre of the nested system. Another 
interpretation could be that the world is chosen randomly. However, the 
interpretations are not reasonable; maybe they do not do justice to the 
madness theory. We are more interested in having a rational analysis of 
what happens in creative activity. This, in an obvious sense, excludes 
the madness theory.
The creativity of Tarantino’s movies or Goethe’s Faustus is not the 
madness, but the deep-going questioning that problematises our way 
of life (or some other fundamental question). The problematisation is 
multimodal. Doctor Faust is a paradigmatic example of a Western sci-
entist. However, Goethe interconnects the inquiry to the ethical ques-
tion in a way that forces us to rethink the fundament of our knowledge-
seeking and, more generally, the fundament of the Western lifestyle. 
The modalities that are under problematisation are epistemic and ethic, 
but these are interconnected to practical lifestyle. Similarly, Tarantino’s 
movies underline the banality of violence; they force us to problematise 
the mere being of human.2 So, the other way to characterise the notion 
of creativity is connected to the different kinds of modalities. The basic 
idea is to characterise something as creative if it forces us to re-evaluate 
our basic modalities. Violence becomes normal behaviour – are we still 
humans? The more famous example is the story of Oedipus. Oedipus 
is a well-educated, cultivated, and strongly moral person. According to 
standards of antiquity, he is a good person. He is trying to do well – he 
is brave, wise, and proud. He seeks knowledge and behaves on the basis 
of his best knowledge. How deep is our responsibility? What is good for 
a human being? The story of Oedipus forces us to re-ask questions like 
these. In fact, the responsibility is still an open problem, as present-day 
life shows. Ethical understanding has been under continuous change 
2 Similar problematisation can be seen in Sartre’s plays, such as Huis clos (1944), or 
his novel La nausée (1938).
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– partly because of stories like Oedipus. In fact, Plato was one who 
problematised the ethical thinking of his time (Hintikka, 1962).
Closing words
Creativity is a fundamental property of human beings. It is not easy 
to characterise the notion of creativity. Maybe creativity defies precise 
characterisation. Fiction can be seen as an inspirer of our imagination. 
This is done by creating new horizons that problematise the fundamen-
tal values of human life. This can be done by evaluating different mo-
dalities by characterising practical life from some general point of view. 
This can help us to have a more fruitful life, but also to make us more 
creative. Unfortunately, the notions of creativity and fiction seem to 
escape our analysis. However, in science and in philosophy, we have 
to ask impossible questions. This may help us to become more creative 
and to exercise our fictive thinking.
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SEMANTIKA MOGUĆIH SVJETOVA, FIKCIJA I KREATIVNOST
Arto Mutanen
U tekstu razmatramo pojmove semantike mogućih svjetova, fikciju i kreativ-
nost. Nakana nam je pokazati kako semantika mogućih svjetova omogućuje gene-
riranje nove interpretacije pojmova fikcije i kreativnosti. Kako bismo to učinili, 
moramo razmotriti filozofiju logike. Semantika mogućih svjetova može se koristi-
ti u interpretiranju modalnih pojmova. U tekstu interpretiramo pojmove fikcije i 
kreativnosti kao modalne pojmove. Međutim, naša analiza pokazuje da su pojmovi 
fikcije i kreativnosti multimodalni pojmovi.
Ključne riječi: semantika mogućih svjetova, fikcija, kreativnost, filozofija logike
